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Moore: Moore: Expanding the Power of U.S. Courts

Expanding the Power of U.S. Courts
in Private International ArbitrationModeration Loses to an Extreme
In re Oxus Gold PLC'

I. INTRODUCTION
Since its inception, 28 U.S.C. § 17822 has been the subject of revisions,
amendments, and much debate. This history is symptomatic of the evolving nature of United States presence in the international legal and business world; however, the statutory changes have not always been clear in purpose or application.
In 2004, the Supreme Court granted certiorari for Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 3 in order to solidify interpretation of § 1782's latest rendition, a
1964 congressional revision. Unfortunately, in expanding the accepted scope of §
1782, the Court created new ambiguity, especially in how the statute should relate
to private international arbitration, that has since resulted in differing district opinions and conflicting commentary. This note traces the progression of § 1782
interpretation from pre-Intel precedent to the most recent post-Intel reasoning of
In re Oxus Gold4 and answers the question, "How far should § 1782 reach?"
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Oxus Gold PLC (Oxus) "is an international mining group based in the United
Kingdom." 5 In September 1998, Norox Mining Company Ltd. (Norox), a subsidiary of Oxus, entered into a joint venture with Kyrgyzaltyn Open Joint Stock
Company (Kyrgyzaltyn), which is owned by the Republic of Kyrgyzstan. 6 Talas
Gold Mining Company (TGMC) was created as a joint venture company to devel7
op the Jerooy gold deposit in the Kyrgyz Republic.
Kyrgyzstan granted TGMC a license to develop the Jerooy gold deposit in
2000.8 When TGMC failed to meet its obligations under the license, the Kyrgyz
government suspended and then annulled the license in 2002. 9 In 2003, TGMC
agreed to continue development on an accelerated schedule; and Kyrgyzstan reinstated the license.' 0 Finally, in August 2004, when TGMC again failed to meet

1. No. 06-82-GEB, 2007 WL 1037387 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2007).
2.28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2006).
3. 542 U.S. 241, 241 (2004).
4. In re Oxus Gold PLC, 2007 WL 1037387, at *1.
5. d.
6. Id.
7. Id. TGMC is majority controlled by Oxus, not Kyrgyzaltyn. Id.
8. Id.
9. In re Matter of Application of Oxus Gold PLC, No. 06-82, 2006 WL 2927615, at *1 (D.N.J. Oct.
11,2006).
10. Id.
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expectations, the Kyrgyz government canceled the license and withdrew Oxus'
rights to the mine."
In November 2005, Jack Barbanel, managing director of SIG Overseas Ltd.
(SIG), contacted the Kyrgyz government on behalf of Global G.o.l.d. Holding
Gmbh (Global Gold). 12 Barbanel represented that Global Gold was interested in
competing for the license to develop the mine.' 3 Barbanel and the Kyrgyz Republic reached no agreements regarding the license 14 before February 2006 when,
"[a]fter unsuccessful attempts to have [its 1]icense reinstated, Oxus halted develof the Jerooy Mine," and began the following series of legal proceedopment
15
ings.
In March 2006, TGMC initiated three actions in Kyrgyzstan's Bishkek InterRegional Court challenging the legality of the Kyrgyz government's actions with
respect to the Jerooy license.' 6 Two months later, the Kyrgyz government indicated an intention to file a Claim for Compensation against TGMC for failing to
fulfill its obligations under the license.1 7 Oxus responded immediately by filing a
"Notice of Claim and Request for Arbitration . . . against the Kyrgyz Republic
under the United Kingdom-Kyrgyz Bilateral Investment Treaty (the "BIT"), [asserting] that the Kyrgyz government's actions with respect to the Jerooy [license]
violated the BIT."' 8
In August 2006, Oxus filed an ex parte application with the United States
District Court of New Jersey to obtain discovery from Barbanel and SIG for use in
all of the above proceedings. 19 The subpoena request was granted pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1782 (Section 1782 Order),20 which enables a district court to order discovery for use in a foreign or international tribunal. 2'
Barbanel promptly answered this ruling with a motion to vacate the Section
1782 Order, but Magistrate Judge Hughes denied the request for vacatur. 22 Relying in part on the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the § 1782(a) phrase
"foreign or international tribunal, 23 Judge Hughes concluded that the statute encompasses private international arbitration. 24 Barbanel appealed the denial of his
motion.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id
In re Oxus Gold PLC,2007 WL 1037387, at *1.
Id.
In re Matter of Application of Oxus Gold PLC, 2006 WL 2927615, at *2.
In re Oxus Gold PLC, 2007 WL 1037387, at *1.
Id.
Id.

18. Id.
19. In re Matterof Application of Oxus Gold PLC, 2006 WL 2927615, at *2.
20. In re Oxus Gold PLC, 2007 WL 1037387, at *2.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2000). Oxus also filed for an order to serve the subpoena abroad, which was
granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (2006), which reads, "A court of the United States may order the
issuance of a subpoena requiring the appearance... of a national or resident of the United States who
is in a foreign country." In re Oxus Gold PLC, 2007 WL 1037387, at *8 (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1783(a)).
22. In re Oxus Gold PLC, 2007 WL 1037387, at *2.
23. In re Matter of Application of Oxus Gold PLC, 2006 WL 2927615, at *5 (citing Intel Corp. v.
Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 249 (2004)).
24. Id at *6.
25. In re Oxus Gold PLC, 2007 WL 1037387, at *2.
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In the instant case, the District Court rejected this appeal, affirming Judge
Hughes' Section 1782 Order. 26 The court upheld Hughes' decision that discovery
for private international arbitration is "for use",27 in a "foreign tribunal" 28 pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1782.29
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Any examination of a court's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1782, particularly
in regards to the phrase "foreign or international tribunal," should begin with
Congress' 1964 revision of the statute. 30 Following recommendations of the
Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure, Congress revised the
statute's language to allow a district court to order discovery "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal .... ,.31 This new language replaced
the standard established in a 1949 amendment to the statute, which provided for
discovery relating to "any judicial proceeding pending in any court in a foreign
country. 32
A. "Foreignor InternationalTribunal" Does Not Include PrivateInternationalArbitration
In 1999, two District Courts addressed this change, and particularly the scope
of the phrase "foreign or international tribunal," in relation to private international
commercial arbitration.33 In NBC v. Bear Stearns,34 the Second Circuit examined
the plain meaning of the text in the revised § 1782 and, finding that the ordinary
and natural meaning of "foreign or international tribunals" was sufficiently ambiguous to neither include or exclude private arbitration, turned to legislative purpose to determine the meaning of the statute.

26. Id. at *8.
27. Id. at *7.
28. Id. at *5.
29. Id. at *8. Barbanel also filed a motion to vacate the Section 1783 Order. Id. Judge Hughes
granted the request because a plain reading of § 1783 unambiguously requires that the request for
service abroad be in connection with a legal proceeding in the United States. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §
1783(a) (2000)) ("the statute requires Petitioner to show that (1) there is a pending proceeding in the
United States .... ). Oxus cross-appealed the grant of Barbanel's motion to vacate the Section 1783
Order; but the District Court rejected the cross-appeal, affirming Judge Hughes' decision. Id. The
court held that a subpoena for § 1782 discovery will not qualify for service abroad under 28 U.S.C. §
1783 unless the foreign proceeding is "in connection with a pending proceeding in the United States."
Id. at *2-'8.
30. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 241 (2004).
31. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
32. Steven M. Saraisky, Comment, How to Construe Section 1782: A Textual Prescriptionto Restore the Judge's Discretion, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127, 1131 (1994) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).
33. See INT'L LAW FIRM OF FULBRIGHT & JAWORsKI L.L.P., 2007 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
REPORT: US COURTs ExPAND DIscOvERY ININT'L ARBITRATION 1, 1-2 (John Bowman ed., 2007),
http://www.fulbright.com/images/publications/PublA.pdf.
34. NBC, Inc. v. Bear Steams & Co., Inc., 165 F.3d 184 (2d Cir. 1999).
35. Id. at 188.
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In examining the congressional reports, the court concluded that congress had
in mind only governmental entities acting as representatives of states.36 The court
pointed to § 1782's replacement of the old 22 U.S.C. § 2703' as the most compelling evidence of congressional intent to exclude private international arbitration
from the reach of § 1782.38 The text of § 270 authorized international tribunals to
administer oaths, issue subpoenas, and charge contempt; and the court determined
that there was no question that these functions of § 270 applied only to intergovernmental tribunals. 39 Even more importantly, § 270 "applied only to international tribunals 'established pursuant to an agreement between the United States
and any foreign government or governments.'" '4 In these changes, the court
found clear intention to broaden the scope of the surviving statute to include international tribunals involving countries other than the United States but no intention
the
to extend the reach of § 1782
41 to private arbitration, which was far beyond
scope of the original statutes.
The second case of 1999 to consider § 1782 was In re Republic of Kazakhstan
v. Biedermann Int'l.42 In Republic of Kazakhstan, the Fifth Circuit also determined that the revised § 1782 should not be interpreted to encompass private international arbitration.43 The court referred back to NBC's discussion of § 1782's
legislative history and affirmed its conclusions about the congressional intent
behind the revisions. 44 In addition, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that arbitration is
intended to be a "speedy, economical, and effective means of dispute resolution";
and reading § 1782 as allowing world-wide procedural wrangling-contests for
advantage, delaying tactics, etc-in private international arbitration would subvert
the purpose and greatest benefits of arbitration.45 Thus, the Fifth Circuit joined
the Second Circuit in holding that the phrase "foreign and international tribunals"
in 28 U.S.C. § 1782 should not be interpreted as authorizing "resort to United
46
States federal courts to assist discovery in private international arbitrations."
B. The Supreme Court Weighs In- "Foreignor InternationalTribunal"
May Include PrivateInternationalArbitration
In 2004, the Supreme Court decided Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices,
Inc.,47 a case originating from the Ninth Circuit. 48 The District Court followed the
Second and Fifth Circuit precedent and ruled that § 1782 did not authorize domestic discovery for use in private foreign proceedings. 49 However, the Ninth Circuit
36. Id. at 189.
37. 22 U.S.C. §§ 270-270(g) (1958).
38. NBC, 165 F.3d at 189.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 189-90 (citing Hans Srnit, Assistance Rendered by the United States in Proceedings Before InternationalTribunals, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 1264, 1269 (1962)).
41. Id. at 190.
42. 168 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 1999).
43. Id. at 883.
44. Id. at 881-82.
45. Id. at 883.
46. Id.
47. 542 U.S. 241 (2004).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 241.
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Court of Appeals reversed this judgment, ruling that the District Court had the
authority to allow discovery in this case under § 1782.50 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider,
for the first time, the interpretation and application
51
of the revised statute.
The Intel case involved a discovery request in a U.S. Court for use in a dispute before the Commission of the European Communities (the European Commission). 52 The Supreme Court ruled that the European Commission was a foreign or international tribunal, at least when acting as "a first-instance decisionmaker," under § 1782(a).53 Just as in the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuit courts,
the Supreme Court placed great importance on the revision of § 1782. 54 Again,
the phrase "foreign or international tribunal" bore particular relevance to the
court's final decision, since the phrase is open to inte retation and finding such a
tribunal in the case is necessary for applying § 1782. So, the court considered
whether or not the European Commission cualified
as such a tribunal, taking into
6
account the history of the statute's revision.
The European Commission is the executive and administrative body of the
European Communities, established under the European Union Treaty.57 The
Commission is authorized to enforce the Treaty components with "written, binding decisions, enforceable through fires and penalties. ... [and] appealable to the
Court of First Instance and [ultimately,] the European Court of Justice.",58 As
such, the Supreme Court reasoned that the Commission
was, at the least, a pro59
ceeding leading directly to quasi-judicial proceedings.
Returning to the history of the 1964 revision of § 1782, the Court examined
whether such a body falls within the new version of § 1782.60 They first looked to
the congressional record used in NBC and Republic of Kazakhstan, noting that
Congress understood the change in statutory language as providing for the possibility of judicial assistance with foreign administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings. 61 The Court went further by citing Professor Hans Smit, the leader of the
1964 commission that drafted the § 1782 revisions, 62 who wrote that "[t]he term
'tribunal' . . . includes investigating magistrates, administrative and arbitral tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies .
*...,,63
Based on these combined resources,
50. Id. at 246.
51. Id. at 253.
52. Id. at 246.
53. Id. at 246-47.
54. Id. at 248. The court referencing the replacement by Congress of, "in any judicial proceeding
pending in any court in a foreign country," with "in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal."
Id. at 248-49.
55. Id. at 257-58.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 250.
58. Id. at 252.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 257-58.
61. Id. at 258.
62. In re Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 882 n.4 (5th Cir. 1999).
63. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 258 (citing Hans Smit, InternationalLitigation Under the United States
Code, 65 COLuM. L. REV. 1015, 1026 n.71 (1965) [hereinafter Smit, InternationalLitigation]). Recent
commentary has suggested that, although this citation of Professor Smit's writings was clearly dicta, it
is this reference that paves the way for extending the reach of § 1782 far beyond its traditional application. INT'L LAW FIRM OF FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P., 2007 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
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the Supreme Court decided that they had no reason to exclude the European
Commission, at least as a decision-making body, from the scope of § 1782. 64
In reaching this decision, the Court considered whether its ruling would negatively affect parity between parties in arbitration. 65 The Court pointed out that
U.S. courts are not required, only permitted, to grant discovery requests for private
international arbitration.66 Thus, District courts are free to condition grants on a
"reciprocal exchange of information." 67 At the same time, an international tribun68
al is entirely free to accept or reject whatever information it deems necessary.
Thus, while acknowledging that questions of parity are relevant to a district
court's initial decision whether to order discovery, the Supreme69Court decided this
policy consideration had no place in its statutory interpretation.
C. Extending the Scope of § 1782- "Foreignor InternationalTribunal"
Does Include PrivateInternationalArbitration
In December of 2006, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
decided In re Application of Roz Trading Ltd.,7° interpreting § 1782 in light of the
Supreme Court's Intel decision. 71 The case involved a dispute between partners in
a joint venture that was created with a contract that compelled the parties to resolve their disputes before the International Arbitral Centre of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber in Vienna. 72 The Centre is a private institution that offers
voluntary arbitration services. 7 3 The Roz court maintained that Intel provided
"sufficient guidance ... to determine that arbitral panels convened by the Centre
are 'tribunals"' within the scope of § 1782. 74
The respondents in Roz argued that the case should be controlled by NBC and
Republic of Kazakhstan, rather than Intel.75 However, the court noted that those
two cases were decided five years before Intel; and in addition, Intel's reasoning
"demonstrate[d] the structural and analytical flaws in the Second and Fifth Cir,,76
For instance, though Intel did not expressly
cuits' interpretations of § 1782(a).
designate private arbitral services as tribunals, it quoted approvingly Professor
Smit's writings that included "arbitral tribunals" within the meaning of § 1782,
REPORT: US COURTS EXPAND DISCOVERY IN INT'L ARBITRATION 3 (John Bowman ed., 2007). Fur-

thermore, after the Supreme Court granted certiorarifor Intel Corp., Professor Smit made his opinion
clear regarding the reach of § 1782 saying, "I also hope that the Supreme Court may find it appropriate
to reject the now unanimous, but clearly incorrect, view of two appellate courts that Section 1782 does
not extend its reach to private intemational arbitral tribunals." Hans Smit, The Supreme Court Rules
on the Proper Interpretationof Section 1782: Its PotentialSignificancefor InternationalArbitration,
14 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 295, 298 (2004) [hereinafter Smit, ProperInterpretation].
64. Intel Corp., 542 U.S. at 258.
65. Id. at 261.
66. Id. at 264.
67. Id. at 262.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 261.
70. 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
71. Id
72. Id at 1222.
73. Id. at 1224.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1226.
76. Id.
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contrary to the findings of NBC and Republic of Kazakhstan.7 Also, according to

Intel and contrary to NBC and Republic of Kazakhstan, the history of § 1782's
amendment, "'reflects Congress' recognition that judicial assistance would be
' '78
Fiavailable whether... of a criminal, civil, administrative, or other nature.'
nally, as a matter of common sense, if Congress intended to exclude private arbitration or similar processes, it would have been simple to add "governmental" in
front of "tribunal" during the statute's amendment.79
According to the Roz court, the Intel standard was that an arbitral body making adjudicative, reviewable decisions is a tribunal, "regardless of whether the
body is governmental or private." 80 Asserting reliance on Intel, and expressly
rejecting NBC and Republic of Kazakhstan,81 Roz concluded that discovery under
82
§ 1782 had been extended to reach private international commercial arbitrations.
83
In re Oxus Gold was decided almost simultaneously with Roz; and while the
two cases came to the same basic conclusion, Oxus chose a more moderate approach to expanding § 1782, an approach that drew a much more conservative line
than that drawn by Roz.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The District Court began its analysis of the "foreign or international tribunal"
question by citing Intel's review of the 1964 revision of § 1782.84 The court
found particularly relevant the Supreme Court's reference to the inclusion of "administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings" within the reach of the statute, saying
that the purpose of the language change was "to ensure
that 'assistance is not con85
fined to proceedings before conventional courts."
The court then noted the Second and Fifth Circuit precedent that private international arbitration does not fall within § 1782.86 In particular, the court referenced NBC's conclusion that Congress intended the revised § 1782 to cover only
governmental or intergovernmental tribunals, conventional courts, and other statesponsored tribunals; and therefore, tribunals created by private organizations
should not fall within the statute. 87 However, rather than directly accept or reject
this precedent, the court distinguished the
88 Oxus dispute on the basis of its connection with a Bilateral Investment Treaty.
The BIT between the United Kingdom and Kazakhstan mandated that disputes between nationals (or companies of nationals) of these countries would be
77. Id. at
78. Id. at
79. Id. at
80. Id. at
81. Id.

1224-25. Smit, InternationalLitigation, supra note 63, at 1026-27.
1226 (citing Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 259 (2004)).
1226 n.3.
1228.

82. INT'L LAW FIRM OF FULBRIGHT & JAWORSKI L.L.P., 2007 INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
REPORT: US COuRTs EXPAND DISCOVERY IN INT'L ARBITRATION 3-4 (John Bowman ed., 2007).

83. In re Oxus Gold PLC, No. 06-82-GEB, 2007 WL 1037387, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 2, 2007).
84. In re Matter of Application of Oxus Gold PLC, No. 06-82, 2006 WL 2927615, at *5 (D.N.J.
Oct. 11, 2006).
85. Id. (citing Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 249 (2004)).
86. In re Oxus Gold PLC, 2007 WL 1037387, at *5.
87. Id.
88. Id. See also Roger Alford, What is a "Foreign or International Tribunal"?, OPINIO JURIS,
April 11, 2007, http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/1176252984.shtml.
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resolved by arbitration, 89 which would proceed under arbitration standards of the
United Nations. 90 With this in mind, the court reasoned that the arbitration in this
case was not simply a proceeding resulting from a contract between two private
parties. 9' Rather, it was a proceeding authorized by an agreement between nations 92 and carried out in a forum governed by international law. 93 Based on this
interpretation of facts and precedent, the court upheld the Magistrate Judge's holding that the arbitral panel in Oxus was a "foreign tribunal" pursuant 94to § 1782,
stating that this holding "was not clearly erroneous or contrary to law."
V. COMMENT
Oxus both expanded and limited the reach § 1782. Springing from Intel's
ambiguity on the meaning of "foreign or international tribunal," Oxus draws a line
well short of Intel's possible implications. For instance, at the extreme end, Intel
could conceivably be read as encompassing all private arbitration-criminal, civil,
personal, commercial-in any foreign decision making body, whether tied in
some way to a government or wholly, entirely independent from all state entities.
The question is, does the line of Oxus accurately represent the Intel standard; or
should Intel be understood to extend § 1782 farther, as the Roz decision demonstrated?
A. Roz-Approaching the Extreme
Roz considered Intel's review of the § 1782 issue and concluded that the obvious consequence of the Supreme Court's reasoning was to extend § 1782 to
private international arbitration. The relevant difference between the facts of Intel
and those of Roz is that the arbitral body in Roz, the International Arbitral Centre
of the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber in Vienna, was a clearly private institution. Unlike the European Commission in Intel, the Centre was unaffiliated with
a governmental or intergovernmental organization. As such, the court's decision
that the Centre constituted a foreign or international tribunal pursuant to § 1782
was significant. It was the first time § 1782 was applied to a wholly private arbitration.
The Roz decision represents the farthest stretch of implication that can be
drawn from Intel. Examining the reasoning in Intel, including the dicta that fa89. In re Oxus Gold PLC, 2007 WL 1037387, at *5. "Article 8 of the BIT Agreement provides, in
relevant part: Settlement of Disputes Between an Investor and a Host State: (1) Disputes between a
national or company of one Contracting Party and the other Contracting Party concerning an obligation
of the latter under this Agreement in relation to an investment of the former which have not been
amicably settled shall, after a period of three months from written notification of a claim, be submitted
to international arbitration if the national or company concerned so wishes." Id. at *5 n.4.
90. Id. The arbitration panel itself "consists of three private individuals chosen by the parties" and
is governed by the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
Id. at *4-*5.
91. In re Matter of Application of Oxus Gold PLC, No. 06-82, 2006 WL 2927615, at *6 (D.N.J.
Oct. 11, 2006).
92. Id.
93. In re Oxus Gold PLC, 2007 WL 1037387, at *5.
94. Id.
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vorably referenced Professor Smit's opinion about the intention of the amendment
drafters, 95 § 1782 can be construed as reaching private international commercial
arbitration, which is exactly what Roz did.
B. Objection! Commentary On and Criticismsof Roz
The idea of extending § 1782 to private international arbitration, though
hailed by some as an "'exciting development in the arbitration world,"' has not
been met with unqualified acceptance. 96 One commentator lamented,
in reference
97
to Roz, that "the road to Hell is paved with good intentions.
The primary concern is in regards to parity. One of the fundamental principles of any arbitration is that the parties involved will be treated equally. 9 8 If
U.S. courts are open to requests for discovery in private international arbitration, a
request that no other country currently entertains without the approval of the arbitral body, then U.S. entities are now vulnerable to an attack that cannot be defended or returned. 99
The Intel court foresaw this concern and tried to allay fears by explaining that
U.S. courts are not required to grant § 1782 discovery requests, that district courts
are free to place conditions on such grants, and that international tribunals are free
to accept or reject information gathered through such discovery. 100 This element
of discretion in § 1782 allows an adjudicator to simply say "no" in a variety of
circumstances, such as when he or she is "skeptical of the requesting party's authority, suspects a fishing expedition, or finds that ordering the production of evidence would unduly infringe a person's privacy rights . . . ."
,
Therefore, the
Supreme Court saw no reason to expect detriment to any parties, United States or
otherwise, from allowing U.S. district courts the option of assisting
0 2 foreign tribunals that may or may not accept the assistance, at their discretion.'
On the other hand, this approach may implicate a related, secondary concern.
Some argue that expanding § 1782, allowing U.S. courts to grant § 1782 discovery
requests, is placing foreign countries and international tribunals in a difficult position.'0 3 In the event that countries or tribunals are faced with U.S. "assistance"
that does not fit into their systems, they will be forced to choose between parties,
giving or denying advantage. 1° 4 They might also be forced to adjust or waive their

95. See supra note 63.
96. Eric Schwartz & Alan Howard, InternationalArbitration Discovery Applications to Rise?,
5/4/2007 N.Y.L.J. 4 (2007) (citing Global Arbitration Review, weekly e-bulletin, Dec. 20, 2006).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
101. Saraisky, supra note 32, at 1149.
102. See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 261 (2004).
103. Mousa Zalta, Note, Recent Interpretationof 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) by the Supreme Court in Intel
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.: The Effects on FederalDistrict Courts, Domestic Litigants,
and Foreign Tribunalsand Litigants, 17 PACE INT'L L. REV. 413, 441 (2005).
104. Id. at 441-42. Tribunals that allow § 1782 evidence may be faced with an opposing party who
is unable to request similar evidence in another country. Id. at 441 n.222. Alternatively, tribunals that
disallow § 1782 evidence may end up with an opposing party who was able to obtain similar evidence
in another way. Id.
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own laws or processes'°5 -processes that the parties may have counted on when
choosing arbitration in the first place.
C. Oxus Gold-The Moderate Road
In Oxus, the Third Circuit side-stepped the obvious questions about including
or excluding private international commercial arbitration from the scope of § 1782
by focusing on the treaty aspects of the Oxus dispute. The dispute is unquestionably a private, commercial matter, as was the dispute in Intel; but unlike the European Commission in Intel, the arbitral panel in Oxus is not a foreign administrative authority. Though governed by rules of a foreign administrative authoritythe United Nations-the panel is still simply the Treaty-designated decisionmaker following a Treaty-designated procedure. By ruling that this arbitral panel
is an international tribunal under § 1782, the Oxus decision quietly extended §
1782 to private international commercial arbitrations proceeding under a Treaty.
The court could have ruled directly on whether § 1782 now encompasses private international arbitration; and instead, the decision neither embraced nor rejected such an interpretation. In fact, the Oxus decision does not even mention
Intel in support of finding a foreign or international tribunal, despite Intel's emphasis on the issue. Instead, the decision skips back to NBC for most of its foundational6 support, bypassing the Supreme Court's treatment of all the same is10
sues.

Side-stepping in this manner is one way to avoid the potential issues of parity,
which may have been the Oxus court's motivation. 0 7 Extending § 1782 as Oxus
did, only to private international arbitration commencing under the umbrella of a
treaty, has a built in regulating mechanism. It is possible for drafters of future
treaties or of treaty amendments to include language addressing the U.S. discovery rule to which both parties can agree, thus solving the potential problems in a
process consistent with arbitration's principles of cooperation and selfdetermination. This is a small, perhaps unsatisfactory, benefit to Oxus' approach;
and it falls well short of answering definitively that Oxus is the best approach to
post-Intel.
D. Time to Toss the Dice
Both the Oxus and Roz courts considered the Supreme Court's Intel decision
and concluded that it required extending the reach of § 1782 to private international arbitration. The issue is one of degree. Roz demonstrates just how far the
extension can go, but how far should it go? It is clear from Intel that the Supreme
Court intended to decide how far § 1782 should reach when dealing with private

105. Id. at 442. Tribunals may be forced to change their rules of evidence, both to incorporate §
1782 and to reconcile § 1782 with other available methods of gathering evidence. Id. at 442 n.223.
106. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.

107. In re Matter of Application of Oxus Gold PLC, No. 06-82, 2006 WL 2927615, at *7 (D.N.J.
Oct. 11, 2006). The court reiterated Intel's discussion of the district court's discretion, suggesting it
was concerned about parity. Id. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
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international arbitration. Yet, Oxus and Roz have laid the groundwork108for a division of opinion among the districts on just what precisely was decided.
If these cases are used as precedent in their districts or in other districts, the
logical outcome is two lines of Intel interpretation. One line will allow § 1782
discovery in private international arbitration. The other line will resemble preIntel cases, with a small extension to private international arbitration operating
under a Treaty. In practical application, this is a significant split. All the parties
under consideration are private entities operating in international commercial
relationships. Yet, one group of private parties, those that find they are covered
by a Treaty, will have access to U.S. courts. The other group, those in wholly
private arbitration, will have access to U.S. courts in some states but not in others.
This disconnect should be sorted out before it grows; and, despite Oxus' appealing
moderation, it should be sorted out according to the Roz approach.
In short, the Roz decision is simply more in tune with Intel and with current
international legal reality. For instance, one benefit of Intel was that it cleared up
judicially-created restrictions on § 1782, "dispos[ing] of virtually all of the limitations the lower courts had read into" the statute. 1 9 Oxus, on the other hand, holds
on to the reasoning of those lower courts to conclude that § 1782 does not stretch
as far as it can go. 0 It is perhaps the height of counter-productivity to ignore the
Supreme Court when it has laid the groundwork for resolving all the issues in
question.
Roz also mirrors Intel in its reliance on Professor Smit's records and commentary, which Oxus does not mention. The Supreme Court quoted Smit or referenced his writings over ten times in its opinion. Most relevantly, it quoted favorably Smit's statement that, "[t]he term 'tribunal' ... includes investigating magistrates, administrative and arbitral tribunals, and quasi-judicial agencies .... , 2
Roz refers back to this statement as indicative of the Supreme Court's intent;1
and, if Professor Smit's writings on this issue are as important to the Supreme
Court as they seem to be, it would be well to pay attention to his opinions. On the
matter of defining, "foreign or international tribunal," Smit makes his opinion
clear, saying, "I also hope that the Supreme Court may find it appropriate to reject
the now unanimous, but clearly incorrect, view of two appellate courts that Section 1782 does not extend its reach to private international arbitral tribunals."" 3
Finally, Roz seems to be based in the same international legal reality as is Intel. The Intel decision evidences acceptance of the growing participation of U.S.
courts and U.S. businesses in the international legal world. The Supreme Court,
when it decided Intel in 2004, had to be fully aware of the many varied choices for
international adjudication; and just as the original § 1782 drafters could have easily inserted "governmental" in front of "tribunals,"' " 4 it would have been a simple
108. Since the Oxus decision, the Roz case has been appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. Schwartz & Howard, supra note 96.
109. Smit, ProperInterpretation,supra note 63, at 331.
110. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
111. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 258 (2004) (citing Smit, InternationalLitigation, supra note 63, at 1026 n.71 (1965)).
112. In re Application of Roz Trading Ltd., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1225 (N.D. Ga. 2006).
113. Smit, Proper Interpretation,supra note 63, at 298 (citing Republic of Kazakhstan v. Biedermann Int'l, 168 F.3d 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1999)).
114. In re Application of Roz, 469 F. Supp. 2d at 1226 n.3.
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thing for the Supreme Court to expressly exclude private international arbitration.
It did not do so; and in leaving out this exclusion, the Court implies a worldview
that contemplates a more internationally-oriented U.S. legal system than NBC,
Republic of Kazakhstan, or Oxus allows.
In light of these considerations, it seems clear that Oxus does not belong in a
post-Intel U.S. legal system. Instead, Roz was correct in allowing discovery for
use in private international commercial arbitration, pursuant to § 1782. However,
there is some wiggle room for the Supreme Court. After seeing the full expansion
of § 1782 play out, including commentators' discussion of policy concerns, the
Court may wish to draw a line somewhere short of Roz. If so, the Court can exploit the small window they left in Intel by not explicitly rejecting lower courts'
exclusion of private international arbitral tribunals from § 1782. I15 However,
moving in that direction would be out of sync with the U.S.' steady progression
toward a more internationally active legal presence. Such a move would be both
unwise and inconsistent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's Intel decision took up long-standing questions about the
reach and scope of § 1782 discovery and ruled that U.S. courts can grant discovery in international arbitration. However, because the decision did not expressly
include or exclude private international arbitration, the first two cases to address
the issue after Intel came to contrary results. Roz decided that Intel expanded §
1782 to reach all private international arbitration; while Oxus only applied § 1782
to private international arbitration conducted under a Treaty, ignoring the more
direct route that Roz took. These two cases set the stage for a split between circuits.
The Supreme Court should resolve this issue before the split spreads to other
circuits, and despite commentators' policy objections, the issue should be settled
along the lines of Roz. The Roz decision is more true to the reasoning and conclusions of Intel than is Oxus, and Roz is also more in line with the reality of the international legal world. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has already acknowledged, discussed, and dismissed the suggestion that the policy concerns should be
dispositive for the Court's statutory interpretation. Thus, the Supreme Court
should step in and definitively rule that § 1782 does extend to private international
commercial arbitration.
AMY MOORE

115. Smit, ProperInterpretation,supra note 63, at 332.
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